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THE POLITICS OF RANDOMNESS
Abstract
The main drawback of the public-policy contest is that the notion of contest
success function, a crucial component of the contest model, does not have micro-
foundations and, therefore, the random behavior of the government seems ad-hoc.
In the present paper we propose a partial micro-foundation for the public-policy
contest. The possible rationalization of random government behavior is illustrated
in the case of the all-pay auction and Tullock's lottery logit functions. We also
clarify how stake asymmetry, lobbying-skill asymmetry and return to lobbying
effort determine the relative desirability, from the government's point of view, of
these CSFs.
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I. Introduction
Much of the recent literature in political economy is based on models that are useful
for analyzing the interrelationship between economic and political agents under
alternative given institutional settings, see Persson and Tabellini (2000) and
Grossman and Helpman (2001) and the references therein. Typically, in the overall
game-theoretic equilibria in these settings, economic and political outcomes are
mutually consistent. A major advantage of these models is that they have explicit
micro-foundations. However, the results derived from these valuable models critically
depend on the assumed political institutions, agents' preferences and policy space.
1
The study of the  regularities of the effect of lobbying on the nature of public policy in
representative democracies cannot therefore be based on such elaborate models
because they are sensitive to the institutional setting and to the assumptions regarding
the nature of the policy space or the agents' preferences. Our claim is that the study of
such regularities can be based on the complementing, reduced-form, simple contest
approach that captures the basic forces affecting the relationship between policy and
lobbying in a large variety of democratic political environments. The contest approach
is not useful for dealing with important theoretical topics such as the role of
asymmetric information in politics. It is also not suitable for studying economic
policy determination in a general equilibrium setting, given a particular set of political
institutions. It is useful, however, for explaining the basic interrelationships between
public policy, the government's objectives and the characteristics of the interest
groups that engage in influence activities. This approach, which was proposed by
Tullock (1980), has been extensively enriched and generalized.
2 Recently, an
extended such contest has been proposed to study public-policy determination,
                                                
1 For example, as noted by Persson and Tabellini (2000), when studying electoral competition, two-
party or two-candidate elections are assumed. The treatment of legislative decision usually entails
drastic simplifications, particularly when modeling the process of government formation and
dissolution in parliamentary democracies. The role of government administration in shaping the details
of economic policy is almost always ignored. The policy space is often assumed to be uni-dimensional
and preferences are usually represented by restricted single peaked or concave utility functions.
2 The list of references in the last survey of the rent-seeking literature, a survey that focuses on the
modeling of rent-seeking contests, Nitzan (1994), contains 104 items. Presently the number of papers
in this literature has risen to more than 260.2
Epstein and Nitzan (2002b). This extended contest emphasizes the dual importance of
the government as an agenda setter and as a decision maker that approves or rejects
policy proposals, while highlighting the significance  of lobbying by organized
interest groups and the prevalence of rent-seeking activities. Albeit, the main
shortcoming of the contest approach is that it does not have micro-foundations. In
particular, the contest success function (CSF), a crucial component in this model, is
exogenous and this implies that the behavior of the government is ad-hoc as no
attempt is made to rationalize it. The objective of this paper is to provide a partial
micro-foundation for the CSF that plays such a central role in the literature on
contests or rent-seeking games, and, in particular, in the extended public-policy game
mentioned above.
3  Our rationalization of such CSFs hinges on the existence of
government (politician) preferences that take into account the lobbying outlays of the
interest groups, in addition to the public well being
4. A simple, fundamental condition
rationalizes the random behavior of the government and, in turn, the existence of a
CSF that is assumed to be exogenous in numerous studies in the contest literature
5.
The most commonly used CSFs are Tullock's (1980) logit-form functions and the
function associated with all-pay auctions that awards the prize to the most active rent
seeker, Hillman and Riley (1989). In public-policy contests the government is usually
assumed to be a passive player that only randomly approves or rejects policy
proposals, Epstein and Nitzan (2002a), (2002c), as in the standard contest literature.
In the extended public-policy contest, the government is an active rational 'principal'
who determines policy in two senses; it proposes the policy and randomly approves or
rejects it, Epstein and Nitzan (2002b). In this extended setting, the government selects
a policy anticipating the lobbying efforts of the interest groups. On the one hand, it
acts rationally in selecting a proposed policy (in setting the agenda) and, on the other
hand, it acts randomly (seemingly "irrationally") in approving or rejecting its
proposed policy. Our main result establishes that under an appropriate mix of
                                                
3 For the related pressure group literature, see for example, Becker (1993) and Glazer and McMillan
(1992). 
4  The lobbying efforts on which we focus are interpreted as resources that buy influence (e.g.,
campaign contributions) rather than resources involved in the dissemination of information by one
means or another. For a detailed discussion on these alternative lobbying activities, see Grossman and
Helpman (2001).
5 For an axiomatic characterization of CSFs, see Skaperdas (1996).3
objectives (desire to enhance the public well being and desire to increase the lobbying
outlays) random behavior in the former narrower setting and "mixed" behavior in the
extended latter setting is rational
6. Our secondary results illustrate the rationalization
of the most widely studied contests and clarify under what conditions a Tullock's
logit-form CSF is preferred, equivalent or inferior to the all-pay auction. 
II. The Public Policy Contest
In the basic one-stage contest setting there are two risk-neutral interest groups, the
low and high benefit groups L and  H.  Both interest groups are directly affected by
the government’s (politician's) choice of one of two exogenously given policies. The
stake of player i (i=L, H) is denoted by ni , where  L H n n ≥ .  In this contest the
government has no control on the agenda: the two possible policies. Typically, one
policy is the status-quo policy and the other policy is some new alternative policy and
the government has to approve or reject the proposed new policy. In the extended
two-stage contest the government controls the agenda. Typically, in the first stage of
the game, it selects the proposed new alternative policy. In the second stage of the
game, the payoffs of the two interest groups again depend on the binary policy choice
of the government: the approval or rejection of the proposed new policy.  
The government could decide to select the policy that results in the realization
of the higher stake, i.e., the policy that generates the stake nH  for H
7.  An alternative
option for the government is to choose randomly between the two different policies
that it faces. Clearly, if the utility the government derives from the selection of a
policy is positively related to the aggregate net payoffs (stakes) of the interest groups,
then it would never randomize, that is, it would select the policy  that generates the
higher stake
8.
                                                
6  For a discussion on rational policy-target ambiguity in electoral competition, see Alesina and
Cukierman (1990) and Shepsle (1972).
7 In the extended game, this option exists for any two feasible policies and, in particular, for the
equilibrium pair of policies (the status quo policy and the equilibrium alternative proposed  policy).
8 In our complete information setting, a lottery on the possible policies is an inferior strategy. Under
incomplete information, however, where the former strategy is not feasible, a lottery can be an efficient
strategy. In particular, although it is vulnerable to resource misallocation, it can dominate some
alternative non-market allocation mechanism like a waiting line auction (queue system) that involves
rent-seeking costs, Boyce (1994), Holt and Sherman (1982), Suen (1989), Taylor, Tsui and Zhu (2001)4
There is yet a third possibility. The politician can deliberately create a public-
policy contest the outcome of which is the probability of realization of the two
possible policies: the status-quo policy and the new policy proposal. By assumption,
the approval of the proposed policy results in its realization and its rejection implies
that the alternative status-quo policy is realized. The probabilities of realization of the
two policies in the complete-information public-policy contest (in the basic or in the
extended contest) are given by the contest success function (CSF). This function
specifies the relationship between the interest groups' investment in the so called
influence, lobbying or rent-seeking activities and the probability of realization of the
two policies.
9 Denote by Pr i the probability of realization of player i’s preferred
policy (see, for example, Baik (1999), Epstein and Nitzan (2002a), (2002b), (2002c)
and Nti (1997)). A player’s stake is secured if he wins the contest, that is, if ex-post
his preferred policy is the outcome of the contest.  Recall that for one player the
desirable outcome is associated with the approval of the proposed policy while for the
other player the desirable outcome is realized when the proposed policy is rejected.
Given the CSF and the stakes, the expected net payoff (surplus) of interest group i can
be written as follows:
(1)           () i x i n i i w E − = (.) Pr    
If the risk neutral player i chooses a pure strategy, xi denotes his lobbying effort. If he
chooses a mixed strategy, xi denotes his expected effort.  
As commonly assumed in the recent political economy literature, Grossman
and Helpman (2001), Persson and Tabellini (2000), let the government’s objective
function be a weighted average of the expected social welfare and lobbying efforts:
(2)                             () () () ( ) ( ) H L H L x x w E w E G + − + + =α α 1 (.)
                                                                                                                                           
and Koh, Yang and Zhu (2002).    
9 Modeling the contestants as single agents presumes that they have already solved the collective action
problem.  The model thus applies to already formed interest groups. 5
The parameters α and (1-α) are the weights assigned to the expected social welfare
and the contestants’ lobbying outlays.
III. The  Condition for Preferred Randomness
If the government decides not to generate a contest and choose the policy that
generates the higher stake nH,
10 then the value of the government’s objective function
is equal to H n α .  It is therefore sensible for the government to create a contest if and
only if the expected value of its objective function increases as a result of the
existence of the contest. That is, 
11  
(3)  () () () ( ) ( ) H H L H L n x x w E w E α α α> + − + + 1
Rewriting (3), given (1), PrL+PrH =1,  0 Pr > i (both players participate in the contest)














Whether this condition is satisfied or not hinges on the CSF, on the parameters nL , b
and  α  that represent the contestants' stakes and the weights assigned by the
governments to its two utility components, and on the resulting equilibrium lobbying
efforts of the contestants  H L x x +  and, in turn, on their contest winning probabilities
L Pr  and Pr H . Given the CSF and the three parameters, the above condition is
satisfied if the lobbying efforts of the interest groups are sufficiently large or the
contest winning probability of the low-stake player is sufficiently low. This simple
condition has the following straightforward implications regarding the effect of the
parameters: 
                                                
10  In the extended public-policy contest, the relevant  H n  corresponds to the sub-game perfect
equilibrium policy proposal of the government. See footnote 7.
11 Notice that the lobbying efforts and the corresponding contest winning probabilities of the players
and their expected payoffs are computed in the Nash equilibrium of the public-policy contest. 6
(i) When b ≥ 1, inequality (4) requires that  5 . 0 < α . That is, a necessary condition
for the existence of an effective incentive for a politician to create a contest is that the
weight he assigns to social welfare is lower than the weight assigned to the
contestants’ lobbying outlays,  5 . 0 < α . More generally,  equation (4) highlights
which parameter values of (1-α )  make random behavior more attractive to the
government. A sufficiently low level of this parameter implies that  random behavior
is irrational. In such a case the government would not bother to create a contest. If
() α − 1  is sufficiently high, namely, the government assigns a sufficiently high weight
to the lobbying outlays of the interest groups, then it is sensible to create a contest and
act randomly in approving or rejecting the policy it proposes. A rational politician
who only cares about the public well being will never choose to act randomly
12. If he
cares just about extracting tangible rents for himself, as explicitly or implicitly
assumed in many studies that followed Tullock (1980), that is, if () α − 1 =1, then
acting randomly is his preferred alternative, provided that  the contestants' lobbying
efforts are positive. 
(ii) If the contest is symmetric in terms of the lobbies' stakes, ( nL =  nH , i.e., b= 1 and
5 . 0 < α ), then the government always prefers to act randomly according to the CSF
of this contest, rather than select the policy yielding the higher stake with certainty.
The reason for this is that when both stakes are identical  n n n L L H H = + Pr Pr .  The
politician therefore always gains  n α , regardless of who wins the contest.  In such a
case any contest that generates positive lobbying efforts is preferred to the 'no contest'
alterative, provided that the weight assigned to the lobbying efforts is larger than the
weight assigned to the aggregate net payoffs of the interest groups.
(iii) Rational randomness, i.e., preference of a contest, requires the existence of
contest equilibrium. In the case of a pure strategy equilibrium, the following first and
                                                
12 When lobbying takes the form of information transmission, it can be a welfare enhancing activity,
Gradstein (2002), Lagerlof (1997) (The allocative efficiency role of rent seeking in the context of the
internal organization of a firm was pointed out already in the early eighties by Lazear and Rosen
(1981)). In such a case the existence of a contest could be rationalized not only when the government
assigns a higher weight to the extraction of resources from the lobbies, but also when it assigns a higher7





















i  are also
required for the government to prefer its seemingly ad hoc random behavior according
to the CSF.  Notice that these conditions also ensure that as the stake of a player
increases, his effort as well as his expected payoff are increased.
13  
(iv) The LHS of (3) can be rewritten as:  () ( ) H L H H L L x x n n + + + 2 1 Pr Pr β β , where







 , the weight
1 β assigned to  the expected stakes  () H H L L n n Pr Pr + must be smaller than the
weight  2 β  associated with the lobbing effort () H L x x + , that is,   2 1 β β< .  In
terms of the parameter α , this condition becomes:  3 / 1 < α . For  3 / 1 < α  , which
satisfies the necessary condition for the superiority of the random contest behavior, a
sufficient condition for (4) to hold is that, in equilibrium,
() L L H H H H L n n n x x Pr Pr + − > +  or, equivalently,
() L L L H L H L n b n n x x ) 1 ( Pr Pr − = − > + . This means that for  3 / 1 < α , the contest
                                                                                                                                           
weight to the well being of the contestants and even when  1 = α .
13 To ensure that the equilibrium is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium and that it is unique, in addition to
the assumed properties of the CSF, we have to add the following requirement (see Skaperdas, 1992):
() () () () () () () ()
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assumption means that player  i  has an advantage in terms of ability, if a change in j’s effort positively
affects his marginal winning probability.  In other words, a positive  (negative) sign of the cross
second-order partial derivative of  Pr i ( ) , j i x x , 
i j
i
x x ∂ ∂
∂ Pr
2
, implies that i has an advantage
(disadvantage) when j’s effort changes.  Note that this assumption is satisfied by many contest success
functions that have been studied in the literature (see Skaperds, 1992).8
should generate outlays that are larger than the expected difference between the
contestants' stakes. As is already known, when both stakes are equal,  nL =  nH = n,
this condition is satisfied.
IV. Applications
A.  The most common CSFs
The following examples of some of the most widely studied CSFs illustrate the
applicability of the condition for preferred randomness.
A.1. The all-pay auction
Under the extensively studied all-pay auction, see, for example, Hillman and Riley
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α . This latter condition is satisfied if  3 / 1 < α .  We conclude therefore that
from the government standpoint, the all-pay auction is always preferred to "no
contest" whenever  3 / 1 < α . If  1/2 >α >1/3, then the all-pay auction is preferred to "no
contest", provided that the stake asymmetry is sufficiently small.
A.2. Tullock’s lottery logit functions:
(i) The discriminating lottery function: 
Under this CSF, Gradstein (1995), Nti (1997),
L H
L
L x x d
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= + .  Therefore (4) is












. When d=1, the CSF is the non-
discriminating commonly used Tullock's lottery function. It can be readily verified
that for d=1,  the non-discriminating Tullock's contest is always preferred  to "no







> are sufficient conditions for the fundamental condition (4) to be satisfied.
That is, for the contest to be preferred to a certain approval or rejection , the weight
assigned by the government to the contestants' aggregate expected payoffs has to be






Notice that d is the weight assigned to the player with the higher stake. The condition
implies that the skill-effectivity of the high-stake player must be sufficiently high. The






smaller than one. That is, although the lobbying effectivity of the high-stake player
must be sufficiently high, he can still be disadvantaged in terms of his lobbying skills.
This means that for a sufficiently small  α ,  α <1/3, the contest is preferred to "no
contest", if stake asymmetry is sufficiently low. But the asymmetry in lobbying
effectivity can be either sufficiently low or sufficiently high, dependent on whether
the high-stake player is disadvantaged or advantaged in terms of lobbying skills.
(ii) The generalized lottery function
Under this CSF, Lockard and Tullock (2001),  2 Pr ≤
+




































= + . Therefore (4) is










b r b r
α
α
.  In this case the contest  is always
preferred to "no contest" whenever  3 / 1 < α  and   1 ≥ r  .   Given b, the condition
provides a lower bound for r.  As r decreases the return to effort decreases and,
therefore, in equilibrium the effort invested in the contest decreases and so, for a
sufficiently low level of the coefficient r,  condition  (4) will not be satisfied. 
B. Comparison of the common CSFs
Let us now compare the three different CSFs presented above determining which of
them would be preferred by a politician who designs the contest between the interest10
groups. Clearly, the preferred CSF results in the highest utility G(.).  We thus compare
the LHS of (4) corresponding to the different CSFs.
B.1. The all-pay auction vs.  the discriminating lottery function  
The all-pay auction is preferred to the discriminating lottery function iff
() () > +
−














, namely, iff  1 > () 1 + b d
b d
. Since
this latter inequality is always satisfied, the all-pay auction is preferred to the
discriminating lottery function. The plausibility of the discriminating lottery function
hinges therefore on the infeasibility of the CSF associated with the all-pay auction.
Such infeasibility is possible, for example, when the political culture forbids a
discriminating CSF of the sort corresponding to the all-pay auction.
B.2. The all-pay auction vs. the generalized lottery function
The all-pay auction is preferred to the generalized lottery function iff
() () > +
−























r b r 1 1 − > ,which may or may not hold. Notice that for  r  ≤ 1, the inequality is
satisfied. That is, when the CSF is of constant or decreasing returns to scale, it is
inferior to the all-pay auction. When r >1, the RHS of the inequality increases in both
r and b. Hence, in such a case, given the return to lobbying r, the all-pay auction is
preferred to the generalized lottery provided that the stake asymmetry b is sufficiently
small. Similarly, given the stake asymmetry b, the all-pay auction is preferred to the
generalized lottery provided that  the return to lobbying r is sufficiently small. For
example, if r=1.5 (recall that  t < 2) and b=2 , then  the generalized lottery function is
preferred to the  all-pay auction.  However,  if  b  = 1.5,  the opposite result is
obtained.  We therefore conclude that the all-pay auction is not necessarily  preferred
to the generalized lottery function. Finally note that in the rent-seeking literature when
the CSF is assumed to be the generalized lottery function, for the sake of simplicity, r
is often assumed to be equal to one. Our analysis implies that this assumption makes a
significant difference because it raises doubts regarding the plausibility of the
assumed CSF that now becomes inferior to the all-pay auction. 11
V. Concluding Remarks
We have argued that the CSF, a basic component in contest theory, has a plausible
micro-foundation. That is, the government random behavior can be rationalized both
when it acts randomly, as in the standard influence activities, lobbying or rent-seeking
models, or when it acts rationally in setting the agenda (making policy proposals) and
randomly in approving or rejecting these proposals. Our argument has been illustrated
using the most commonly studied CSFs; the function applied in the analysis of all-pay
auctions and two types of logit functions: Tullock's discriminating lottery function
and Tullock's generalized lottery function.
          In general, when the stakes of the interest groups differ, a necessary condition
for preferred randomness is that the weight the government assigns to the contestants'
aggregate net payoff is smaller than the weight assigned to the contestants' lobbying
efforts. When the weight assigned to the aggregate gross stakes is smaller than the
weight assigned to the total lobbying efforts, random behavior is preferred to a certain
"no contest" behavior, provided that the contest generates outlays that are larger than
the expected difference between the contestants' stakes. We have shown that random
behavior can be rationalized if the weight assigned to the lobbying efforts is
sufficiently high or stake asymmetry is sufficiently small.  
          In the special cases of the most commonly studies CSFs, we have obtained
three further interesting results: (i) the all-pay auction can be rationalized if the weight
assigned to the aggregate gross stakes is smaller than the weight assigned to the total
lobbying efforts. (ii) random behavior conforming to a discriminating lottery function
is preferred to a certain "no contest" behavior, if the weight assigned to the aggregate
gross stakes is smaller than the weight assigned to the total lobbying efforts and the
lobbying-skill effectivity of the high-stake contestant is sufficiently high. (iii) The
generalized lottery function can be rationalized if the return to lobbying is sufficiently
high. Finally, it has been shown that the all-pay auction is always preferred to the
discriminating lottery CSF. However, it is not necessarily superior to the generalized
lottery CSF. When the generalized CSF is of constant or decreasing returns to scale, it
is inferior to the all-pay auction. When the generalized CSF is of increasing returns to
scale, it is inferior to the all-pay auction provided that the stake asymmetry is
sufficiently small or the return to lobbying  is sufficiently small.
          The micro-foundation of random government behavior has been provided in a
context of lobbying that buys influence, disregarding the possible informational role12
of lobbying, Grossman and Helpman (2001). Our argument is nevertheless valid in
the broader context where lobbying can be of both types. In a more general setting,
the rationalization of a lobbying contest and, in particular, of random behavior, can be
based not only on the government's interest in extracting resources from the lobbies,
but also on its interest in enhancing the aggregate equilibrium well being of the
interest groups. When lobbying takes the form of activities that buy influence, it can
clearly induce the government to prefer the existence of a contest. When lobbying
takes the form of information transmission, it can also induce the government to
prefer a contest behavior, because such  lobbying can be welfare enhancing, Gradstein
(2002), Lagerlof (1997). In such a broader context the effect of the relevant
parameters and, in particular, their relative effect on the incentives of the government
to prefer the existence of a lobbying contest, certainly deserve a careful study.
          The first part of our analysis is confined to the comparison between two options
the government faces: a certain "no-contest behavior" and a random "contest
behavior" according to one particular CSF. The analysis is then extended to the
comparison between a certain "no contest" behavior and random contest behavior that
conforms to the most widely used CSFs. These restrictions naturally raise the
question: Why do we focus on just these options. One could wonder, in particular,
why we confine the analysis to just these CSFs, ignoring the possibility that the
government looks for the "reasonable" or the "optimal" CSF?. Trying to suggest a
workable definition for reasonableness, Skaperdas (1996) supplies axiomatizations for
certain CSFs. The search for an optimal CSF has also started. A partial resolution of
the problem of an "optimal contest design" is provided in Dasgupta and Nti (1998)
and Nti (1997),(2002).
14,15 One could also wonder what can be said about the
comparison between the stylized, reduced-form public-policy contest that was briefly
discussed in this paper and some of the elaborate, political-economic models that
were recently extensively used in the analysis of endogenous public policy. Both of
these important issues are beyond the scope of the present study which purports to
                                                
14 It has been shown that, in two special classes of symmetric logit CSFs, the maximum aggregate
lobbying effort is attained, respectively, by a discriminating lottery function and by an all-pay auction
with a reservation price. The optimal generalized lottery function has also been identified. Finally, it
has been shown that Tullock's constant returns to scale CSF  (r=1) is optimal for a risk-neutral contest
designer whose valuation for the prize is sufficiently low.  
15 For "optimal contest design" in the different context of research and labor tournaments that focus on
the adverse selection problem associated with the selection of the most highly qualified contestants in
auctions, see Fullerton and McAfee (1999) and the references therein.13
accomplish a more modest yet challenging objective, namely, to present a partial
rationalization of random government behavior that conforms to some feasible CSF. 
      14
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